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The authors propose an empirical 
analysis of the current situation in 
monotowns. The study questions the per-
ceived seriousness of the ‘monotown prob-
lem’ as well as the actual challenges it pre-
sents. The authors use cluster analysis to 
divide monotowns into groups for further 
structural comparison. Since structural dif-
ferences in the available databases limit the 
possibilities of empirical analysis, alterna-
tive approaches are required; the authors 
consider possible reasons for the limitations 
identified. Special attention is paid to the 
monotowns that have been granted the 
status of advanced development territories. 
Comparative analysis makes it possible to 
study their general characteristics and so-
cioeconomic indicators. The authors apply 
the theory of opportunistic behaviour to 
describe potential problems caused by the 
lack of unified criteria for granting mono-
towns the status of advanced development 
territories. The article identifies the main 
stakeholders and the nature of their interac-
tion; it describes a conceptual model built 
on the principal-agent interactions, and 
draws a possible scenario of mutually bene-
ficial cooperation. The solution to the prin-
cipal-agent problem suggested in the article 
contributes to the development of an alter-
native approach to the current situation and 
a rational approach to overcoming the ‘mo-
notown problem’. 
 
Key words: monotown, single industry 
town, institutional agreement, cluster analy-
sis, information asymmetry 
 
Introduction 
 
Issues pertaining to managing mo-
notowns by way of either ensuring their 
viability or choosing a different devel-
opment path are becoming increasing 
relevant. While this phenomenon is of-
ten perceived as an exclusively Russian 
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problem, it became the focus of public attention in other countries much ear-
lier than in Russia. Already in the 1960s, the US and some European coun-
tries were looking for different solutions to socioeconomic problems of 
monotowns [21]. In Russia, special attention to the monotown problem is 
determined by the general conditions of socioeconomic development, with 
the 2008—2009 crisis being a vivid example. In this period, the country wit-
nessed growing willingness to protests among the general public and an in-
creased attention to monotowns from politicians and mass media, as well as 
resumed construction of new factories [4]. Yet a comprehensive assessment 
of the monotown situation is hindered by the lack of relevant information. 
Despite the availability of a regularly updated governmental list of mono-
towns, most of the data necessary for a high-quality analysis is difficult to 
obtain, and statistics provided by Rosstat (Federal State Statistics Servise), 
whose online database is often used to assess the conditions and prospects of 
socioeconomic development of monotowns, is hardly sufficient. This does 
not mean that we cannot advance in empirical studies. This article aims to 
propose approaches to a quantitative analysis of socioeconomic situation in 
monotowns, based on available information and taking into account incen-
tives to rent-seeking behaviour. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first part of the article de-
scribes elements of cluster analysis as applied to a monotown sample in view 
of the existing information limitations. The second part focuses on variables 
and the results of clustering. The third part considers development problems 
of monotowns as advanced development territories in the context of rent-
seeking behaviour. Key results are summarised in the conclusion. 
 
1. An approach to cluster analysis of monotowns 
 
At first, the authors of this article attempted to address the socioeco-
nomic situation in monotowns using the cluster analysis. Monotown clusters 
with similar structure were to be identified based on a statistical data analy-
sis, followed by the development of a special approach to examining the sit-
uation in each cluster. However, in practice, an analysis of statistical data 
proved rather complicated. In April 2015, the list of monotowns was ex-
tended once again [13] and its structure changed. All monotowns were now 
divided into three categories. Each included both large cities with a popula-
tion of over 500,000 people and small villages with several thousand resi-
dents. But is such classification justified? Does it allow us to take into ac-
count all structurally significant factors? 
In keeping with the initial homogeneity criterion1, it was decided to ana-
lyse qualitative characteristics of monotowns in the first category, i. e. those 
most sensitive to socioeconomic changes. The following parameters were 
chosen as benchmarks. 
                                                     
1 The homogeneity criterion is understood as monotowns retaining their positions in 
initial categories. However, there is a possibility that monotowns can be further clas-
sed within each of the three categories. If further classification is possible, an analy-
sis will be simplified, since it will become possible to choose a methodology for ma-
naging monotown risks. 
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1. Fixed assets investment — expenditure on buildings and other means 
of production. This parameter should be taken into account, since the risk of 
principal employer’s facilities becoming obsolete is widely discussed in lit-
erature. It would be interesting to understand whether fixed asset investment 
(in the context of building) affects the balance sheet of a municipality2. 
2. Local budget revenues, including non-repayable receipts — a parame-
ter determining the potential size of funds transferred to a municipality for 
purposes and functions within the agent’s competence. Using this parameter 
is necessitated by the fact that an assessment of the socioeconomic situation 
in a monotown requires information about the size of funds available to the 
municipality. 
3. Personal income tax is a direct tax calculated as a percentage of the 
total income of persons, with due exemptions. This parameter should be used 
to compare monotowns based on expected income of residents. 
4. Revenues from using public and municipal property are a parameter 
determining the revenue associated with the exploitation of public property. 
It is necessary for assessing the reasonableness of expenditure on putting 
property online. 
5. Environmental damages are compensation for environmental pollu-
tion. Environmental risk is often mentioned as a risk associated with mono-
towns. It is evident that monotowns, whose viability depends on the extrac-
tion industry, are more susceptible to this risk than those dominated by the 
processing industry3 are. 
6. Municipal social policy spending is the part of municipal budget allo-
cated to support the welfare of citizens. This parameter is included into the 
analysis to estimate expenditures on maintaining the required socioeconomic 
level. 
7. Population is the number of citizens living in a monotown. This pa-
rameter should be taken into account in comparing the specific amount of 
expenditure in view of the population size. 
Ninety tree first category monotowns were analysed using the SPSS ana-
lytics software. However, it was not possible to classify all 319 monotowns 
by cluster due to two reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, it would be inap-
propriate to compare densely populated towns and villages with few thou-
sand residents. Secondly, statistics available on official websites does not 
make it possible to form clusters for analysis — for instance, some of the 
Volga region towns regularly update statistics, whereas some Siberian towns 
present no information at all. Moreover, the incompleteness of available data 
complicates a panel analysis for the chosen period (2007—2014). At the 
same time, a panel analysis seems to be crucial, since the increased attention 
to the monotown problem observed in crisis periods requires assessing the 
similarity of monotowns’ reactions to external shocks. 
                                                     
2 The authors realize that this parameter is not sufficient to demonstrate municipal 
expenditure on fixed asset maintenance. However, since the Rosstat website does 
not present any more appropriate data, it was decided to use this parameter adding 
an error function, when conducting a cluster analysis. 
3 However, environmental risks are a significant threat in both types of monotowns.  
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Therefore, it would be logical to make the sample as homogeneous as 
possible to increase its qualitative representativeness and retain the possibil-
ity of checking its structural elements after clustering. It was decided to con-
sider towns with a population of over 100,000 people. Generally, in such 
towns there are other employers, apart from the principal one. However, ac-
cording to the governmental monotown list, they are divided into categories 
depending on the socioeconomic situation. Therefore, it is proposed to con-
duct a cluster analysis to estimate the homogeneity of characteristics under-
lying such a classification. If the towns comprising a cluster have similar 
characteristics, they should probably be monitored using a certain scheme. If 
it is not the case, it is important to consider the cause-effect relations behind 
the homogeneity divergences between towns belonging to one cluster both in 
model and in reality. 
 
2. Description of variables and the analysis 
 
23 towns were selected from the governmental list, based on the follow-
ing criteria: 
— a population of over 100,000 people; 
— town statistics available at www. gks. ru in the Russian regions. Ma-
jor socioeconomic indicators of towns — 2014 reference book. 
The following variables were treated as explanatory variables (all vari-
ables were standardised during the analysis): 
I stands for fixed assets investment. This variable is entered as an ex-
planatory variable, since it reflects expenditure on reproducing fixed assets, 
which is especially relevant in the case of monotowns, where the deprecia-
tion of fixed assets and the absence of their reproduction remain major ob-
stacles to the performance of monotowns’ major employers. 
F stands for the number of organisations engaged in manufacturing. This 
variable is included, since most monotowns specialise in extracting and/or 
manufacturing. 
P stands for local population. This parameter is instrumental in detailing 
the scale of problems in a monotown. It also serves as a criterion for select-
ing monotowns for analysis (those with a population of over 100,000 peo-
ple). It is evident that partial resettlement followed by economic diversifica-
tion and relevant initiatives will be more probable and less painful to resi-
dents of a monotown with a population of approximately 100,000 people 
than in a monotown with that of over 200,000 residents. 
L stands for working-age population. The variable is necessary for as-
sessing performance potential in a monotown. 
U is the number of non-working citizens registered with the employment 
office and officially recorded as unemployed. This variable is necessary for 
estimating the pressure on the welfare and social support system. 
Economics  
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AS stands for average nominal gross salary (roubles). It is necessary for 
estimating the average monthly income of a monotown’s population and 
identifying its principal industry. 
Cr stands for the registered crime rate. This variable makes it possible to 
assess the level of potential socioeconomic tension in the town. 
Cat is the category assigned to a monotown in the governmental list (1, 
2, or 3). 
Of course, these variables do not fully reflect the relevant aspects of so-
cioeconomic situation in monotowns. It would be more practical to use the 
overall crime rate, since the registered crime rate can distort the actual pic-
ture. This is especially true in the cases when the ratio between the two types 
of crime is skewed towards unregistered ones. Another example is the nomi-
nal gross salary. This parameter is one of the most available for a quantita-
tive assessment. However, it can hardly be used if one focuses on changes 
over time rather than those within a certain period. Moreover, a more accu-
rate evaluation of this parameter requires understanding the extent of the ef-
fect of distorting factors — outside earnings and temporal consumption 
structure (i. e. changes in consumer debts). 
After selecting variables using the SPSS analytics software, a cluster 
analysis yielded the following classification. 
 
Cluster Town 
Cluster 1 Neftekamsk 
Dmitrovgrad 
Novocheboksarsk 
Severodvinsk 
Kaspiysk 
Nevinnomyssk 
Belovo 
Leninsk-Kuznetsky 
Mezhdurechensk 
Prokopyevsk 
Kamensk-Uralsky 
Pervouralsk 
Serov 
Zlatoust 
Miass 
Custer 2 Tolyatti 
Novokuznetsk 
Cluster 3 Naberezhnye Chelny 
Cherepovets 
Cluster 4 Nizhnekamsk 
Cluster 5 Norilsk 
Cluster 6 Nizhny Tagil 
Magnitogorsk 
A. Shastitko, A. Fatikhova 
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Let us consider each of the clusters and try to understand whether the 
classification criteria match the reality. 
 
Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 1 towns divided into categories4: 
 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
Kaspiysk 
Prokopyevsk 
Pervouralsk 
Neftekamsk 
Nevinnomyssk 
Belovo 
Leninsk-Kuznetsky 
Mezhdurechensk 
Kamensk-Uralsky 
Zlatoust 
Miass 
Dmitrovgrad 
Novocheboksarsk 
Severodvinsk 
Serov 
 
According to the database, towns belonging to category 1 of cluster 1 meet 
the following criteria: 
Population of 105—202 thousand people. 
Number of the employed ranging from 68 to 113 thousand people. 
Fixed assets investment from 1,442 to 2,996 thousand roubles. 
Average nominal gross salary from 17,283 to 26,357 roubles. 
Category 2: 
Population of 101—173.3 thousand people. 
Number of the employed ranging from 57.4 to 97.9 thousand people. 
Fixed assets investment from 842.5 to 11,629 thousand roubles. 
Average nominal gross salary ranging from 21.693 to 33.416 roubles. 
Category 3: 
Population of 107.2—188.4 thousand people. 
Number of the employed ranging from 61.3 to 112.3 thousand people. 
Fixed assets investment from 4124.6 to 7328.1 thousand roubles. 
Average nominal gross salary ranging from 20711.8 to 36983.4 roubles. 
In general, monotowns constituting this cluster have similar characteris-
tics. When analysing the monotowns by categories, one can see that there is 
no significant difference in values. Therefore, such classification can be built 
and applied in practice5. A general solution to the ‘monotown problem’ can 
be found at least for the cluster under consideration. In this case, one should 
answer the question as to what difference is significant and based on what 
criteria it can be acknowledged as such. Moreover, although the population 
of monotowns comprising the cluster, the number of the employed, and the 
                                                     
4 According to Governmental Decree 668-r of April 16, 2015, monotowns of the first 
category are characterised by the most difficult socioeconomic situation, the second by 
risks of the situation deteriorating, and the third by a stable socioeconomic situation.  
5 It is possible to create a completely accurate classification due to structural flaws 
of explanatory variables. At least, when building a mode, some variables are used 
twice, for instance, if the population or the number of the employed are considered.  
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average salary are comparable, fixed assets investment raises a number of 
question, For instance, in category 2 monotowns, it is even smaller than in 
category 1, although it should apparently be vice versa. Is this situation a 
result of production diversification in category 2 monotowns, which can be 
corroborated by smaller municipal expenditure on fixed assets reproduction? 
Is it a result of distorted statistics? It is also possible that some monotowns 
comprising category 2 would be classed as category 1 in the case of an alter-
native combination of socioeconomic factors? 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Cluster 2 is comprised of two towns — Tolyatti of category 2 and Novo-
kuznetsk of category 1. The population of Tolyatti is 718 thousand people, 
whereas that of Novokuznetsk 550 thousand people. At least in terms of 
population, these towns belong to the same category. In Tolyatti, the number 
of the employed is 435 thousand people and, in Novokuznetsk, 328 thou-
sand. In both towns, an almost identical percentage of population can be 
classed as employed. However, in Tolyatti, fixed assets investment reaches 
35098.4 thousand roubles and the average salary 26006.6 roubles, whereas 
in Novokuznetsk, it is 17719.1 thousand roubles and 28980.2 roubles respec-
tively. 
The principal employer in Tolyatti is AvtoVAZ and, in Novokuznetsk 
[6] EVRAZ. It is worth stressing that, whereas Russia’s car market is in the 
state of stagnation (table 1), the country’s metallurgy market is developing 
[5; 8]. 
 
Table 1 
 
A review of Russia’s car market 
 
Sales, thousand units Sales, billion roubles 
January-September January-September Category 
2015 2014 Difference 2015 2014 Difference 
Russian car makes 193 295 – 34 % 96 121 – 21 % 
International makes 
produced in Russia 519 846 – 39 % 600 822 – 27 % 
New imported cars 238 527 – 55 % 349 632 – 45 % 
Total 950 1667 – 43 % 1045 1574 – 34 % 
 
Source: [1]. 
 
Cluster 3 
 
Cluster 3 brings together such towns as Naberezhnye Chelny and 
Cherepovets. Both are classed as category 1 in the governmental list. The 
population size is similar in both towns — 522 thousand people in Na-
berezhnye Chelny and 316.8 thousand people in Cherepovets. The employ-
ment rate in Naberezhnye Chelny is 61.3 % (320 thousand people), and in 
A. Shastitko, A. Fatikhova 
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Cherepovets 60.4 % (191.1 thousand people). Fixed assets investment is al-
most identical in these monotowns — 20,679 thousand roubles in Nabe-
rezhnye Chelny and 22,098 thousand roubles in Cherepovets. As to the aver-
age salary, just as in the other clusters, the values are markedly different — 
25,949 roubles in Naberezhnye Cheney against 36,436 roubles in Cherepovets. 
It is of interest that both towns are classed as category 1. However, in the 
case of Cherepovets, 880 million roubles were allocated for the construction 
of the Cherepovets industrial park [10]. Today, the project includes the con-
struction of a fibrewood panel factory, a gypsum plant, and a pipe plant. 
A 2015 governmental decree included Naberezhnye Chelny in the list of 
monotowns that were granted an advanced development territory (ADT) 
status [18]. Today it is difficult to assess a town’s prospects of acquiring the 
ADT status, despite tax privileges for business, since the lorry market (Na-
berezhnye Chelny’s principal employer is KamAZ — Russia’s largest lorry 
producer) is very sensitive to fluctuations in the economy. However, interna-
tional practices of overcoming ‘monotown crises’ when applied to compa-
nies working on ADT suggest that tax privileges contribute to the develop-
ment of small and medium businesses in a town. Therefore, such initiatives 
will increase Naberezhnye Chelny’s chances of leaving the category of the 
most depressed monotowns. 
 
Cluster 4 
 
A special case is cluster 4 consisting of only one town — Nizhnekamsk 
[10], which is classed as category 3. The key parameters analysed in this 
cluster are as follows: 
Population — 235.6 thousand people. 
Number of the employed — 146.6 thousand people. 
Fixed assets investment — 41113.2 thousand roubles. 
Average nominal gross salary — 28892 roubles. 
The results are somewhat contradictory. Based on the population size 
and salary, Nizhnekamsk could be classed as cluster 1 (category 3). How-
ever, it is not the case due to fixed assets investment being the largest in the 
sample. 
 
Cluster 5 
 
It is another cluster consisting of only one town — Norilsk, which is also 
classed as category 3. 
Population — 1,773 thousand people. 
Number of the employed — 126.1 thousand people. 
Fixed assets investment — 42,881.9 thousand roubles. 
Average nominal gross salary — 66,584 roubles. 
It is not a coincidence that this cluster comprises only one monotown. 
When analysing the selected parameters, one can see that the socioeconomic 
situation in this town is very different from the others. Firstly, the employ-
ment rate in Norilsk is much higher than in the other monotowns (above 
70 %). This is accounted for by the principal employer — Norilsk Nickel — 
Economics  
 12
being a major company and Norilsk the region’s second largest city after 
Krasnoyarsk. Secondly, the values of such parameters as fixed assets in-
vestment and salary are much higher than in the other towns, sometimes it is 
a 1.5—2.5-fold difference. 
In other words, the situation in Norilsk is rather stable and favourable. 
Of course, the reason behind it is the success of the principal employer — 
the Norilsk Nickel mining and smelting company. In the crisis 2008—2009 
years, the company’s top priorities were to avoid lay-offs and maintain so-
cial stability in the regions of operation [8; 26]. Probably, these priorities 
helped Norilsk to recover quickly from the crisis. However, local authorities 
also contributed to overcoming the effects of the 2008—2009 crisis. 
In 2010, a modernisation plan for the town of Norilsk was published on 
the website of the Krasnoyarsk region [6]. The plan was aimed at securing a 
stable economic development of the town. Local authorities stressed that the 
viability of the principal employer, its operation, and thus favourable living 
conditions depended on solving a number of housing and utility problems 
and the prospects of resettling the non-productive population of Norilsk. 
This framework gave rise to projects capable of ensuring industrial moderni-
sation and diversification and solving a number of social security issues. 
Some measures suggested launching an investment project for mine de-
velopment, modernisation of housing, water treatment facilities, and urban infra-
structure, resettlement within a target resettlement programme, creation of social 
infrastructure, and opening a landfill site. According to the plan, the projects are 
to be completed in 2025, thus interim results are not yet available. 
 
Cluster 6 
 
Cluster 6 comprises such towns as Nizhny Tagil and Magnitogorsk, both 
classed as category 3. The population of the first town is 360.7 thousand 
people and that of the second 414.9 thousand. The number of the employed 
is 209.9 thousand people in Nizhny Tagil and 246.8 thousand in Magni-
togorsk. Fixed assets investment in Nizhny Tagil is lower than in Magni-
togorsk — 12,838 thousand roubles and 17,314 thousand respectively. As to 
salary, the difference is smaller — 28,643 roubles in Nizhny Tagil and 
31,429 roubles in Magnitogorsk. The towns are engaged in the same indus-
try. The principal employer of Magnitogorsk is Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel 
Works specialising in black metallurgy. Three major companies operating in 
Nizhny Tagil are EVRAZ (metallurgy), Vysokogorsky mining and process-
ing works (iron ores), and Uralvagonzavod (arms industry). 
 
3. Advanced development territories in monotowns —  
development initiatives or stimuli for rent-seeking behaviour? 
 
It is important to stress that this sample includes towns that were granted 
the advanced development territory (ADT) status [2]. As of September 2015, 
ADT monotowns [17] include Usolye-Sibirskoe (Irkutsk region), Gukovo 
(Rostov region), Yurga (Kemerovo region), and Naberezhnye Chelny (Re-
A. Shastitko, A. Fatikhova 
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public of Tatarstan). The law grants ADT towns a number of privileges — 
special legal regimes for business and other activities (rent exemptions, tax 
privileges, and special regimes of public and municipal control) and with-
drawal of land for ADT buildings and infrastructure [2]. 
Let us consider the four ‘newcomers’ on the monotown list and analyse 
them from the perspective of homogeneity of socioeconomic situation in the 
town (table 2). 
Table 2 
 
Socioeconomic characteristics of ADT towns 
 
Town 
Unem-
ployment 
rate,% 
Fixed capital  
investment  
from 
the municipal 
budget, roubles
Average 
 salary, 
thousand 
roubles 
Industrial 
production
index, % 
Proportion  
of SME revenues 
Usolye-Si-
birskoe 1.21 23.6 million 20.9 62.7 52.4 % 
Gukovo 
1.2 
262.9 million 
[13] 17.3 ... ... 
Yurga 2.25 [1] 718.6 million 
[14] 
17.9 96.6 [14] No data. There is in-
formation that the 
proportion of tax 
revenues is appro-
ximately 22 % [14] 
Naberezh-
nye Chelny 0.81 37,700 million 25.9 96.4 
49,000 million 
roubles[15] 
National to-
tal 5.2 396,000 million 32.5 101.7 [9] — 
 
Source: compiled by the authors based on information from municipalities’ offi-
cial websites. 
 
There are evident differences. Firstly, only one of the four towns — Na-
berezhnye Chelny — has a population of over 100 thousand people. Of cour-
se, this affected the parameter values. However, the other three monotowns 
show similar performance. A special case is Usolye-Sibirskoe, where fixed 
assets investment and industrial production index are at the lowest. It is im-
portant to take into account not only the obtained values but also the compli-
cations relating to data collection. 
The discrepancy between the data available on the Rosstat and town ad-
ministration websites (www. gks. ru suggest that the fixed assets investment 
in Usolye-Sibirskoe is 23.6 million roubles, whereas, according to the ad-
ministration website, it is 803.8 million roubles, including 1.1 million rouble 
investment in construction), 
— The lack of necessary data on the websites of state statistics services 
and town administration (the town of Gukovo). 
— The impossibility of comparing data due to initial structural differ-
ences characteristic of the selected parameters. 
Economics  
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That is why, a structural analysis of ADT monotowns is just a ‘first 
glance’ at their composition, similarities, and differences. In view of the fact 
that these monotowns specialise in different industries and that they were 
granted the ADT status not a long time ago, it is difficult to suppose what 
effect this privileged status will have in the future. In this case, the most ap-
propriate approach would be ‘difference in difference’, which will make it 
possible to predict how the ‘special status’ monotowns will develop as com-
pared to other monotowns. How significant will that difference be? 
Another interesting issue is how the other monotowns with a structure 
similar to ADT towns will react to these privileges. Does it mean that 
monotowns will work towards acquiring the coveted status? If the socioeco-
nomic situation in a monotown is similar to the national average and this 
town is granted the ADT status, why is not this status granted to all other 
towns showing a similar performance? How will it be possible to evaluate 
the actual situation in a monotown? Are there any guarantees that the situa-
tion in an ADT monotown will change for the better? Moreover, the ADT 
status suggests production diversification, which necessitates retraining the 
staff and requires additional spending. 
These considerations compel one to rephrase the question. Is not it rea-
sonable to discuss this problem parametrically, taking into account that we 
are dealing with the system of relationships with the information asymmetry. 
In this case, we should consider both the problem of veracity (and timely 
submission) of necessary data and that of the ‘privileged’ position of se-
lected monotowns. It is important to mention that an attempt at modelling 
was made earlier [20] when discussing an institutional agreement modelling. 
The reference point is the reasonability of continuing a principal employer’s 
operations accompanied by resettling, changing specialisation due to the 
transfer of assets from specific to general, or regular monitoring if maintain-
ing specialisation is justified. However, such institutional agreements work 
only if the problems arising from information asymmetry are solved. 
Let us examine the same agreement in terms of information asymmetry. 
Technically, we are solving the principal-agent problem with the reservation 
that the principal (the non-informed party) is a federal authority whereas the 
agent (the informed party) is the management of a monotown’s dominant 
company. However, the system contains another element — regional au-
thorities, which act as an agent for the mentioned principal and a principal 
for the agent presented by the company’s management. In this case, the re-
gional authorities are the key element of the system, since they serve as a 
mediator6 between the major principal and the agent. 
Let us suppose that the management of the dominant company is inter-
ested in maximising its profit: i  max, where i is a certain function of n 
                                                     
6 We understand that there is a possibility that the beneficiaries of a dominant com-
pany can address the federal centre directly. However, this variant suggests an interac-
tion between the agent and the regional principal. When it comes to financing, 
agents will either fulfil their obligations or not, however, the principal does not have 
this information at the moment.  
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variables, including assets specificity, selling price, parameters of fixed and 
variable costs, etc. The management of a dominant company can receive a 
certain amount of investment f from the federal level for implementing a cer-
tain project expected to have a positive effect on a company’s profit and, 
supposedly, the socioeconomic position of the ith monotown under consid-
eration. However, an agent prone to rent-seeking behaviour [22; 24] can doc-
tor information reporting a difficult financial situation to the regional au-
thorities, which, in their turn, will submit an investment application to the 
federal level. It is important to make the following reservations: 
— we suppose that the financial performance of the dominant company 
has a direct impact on the socioeconomic situation in the monotown (sala-
ries, social benefits, and other parameters); 
— the federal principal can monitor the situation in monotowns with a 
probability of , therefore it can estimate the company’s actual need for ad-
ditional financing with a probability of (1 – ); 
— the regional principal striving to maximise the regional budget and 
stabilise the socioeconomic situation makes an effort of e1 to monitor the 
fulfilment of the company’s obligations after receiving additional investment 
[28]. However, the regional principal can also be characterised by rent-
seeking behaviour [23]. Therefore, it is possible that a part of investment f, 
   0;1 will be absorbed by the local principal and a part of investment 
(1 – )f will be transferred to the dominant company. In this case, the com-
pany’s management owes obligations to the local principal making an effort 
of e2 to monitor their fulfilment. Therefore, e2 < e1; 
— the regional principal has necessary information and can report the 
agent failing to meet their obligations to the federal principal, in their turn, 
the federal principal can impose sanctions s and terminate investment over a 
period of t + 17. 
In view of the above, let us build a probability model. There are follow-
ing parameters: 
PF stands fir the federal principal making investment decisions; 
PR stands for the regional principal, aware or unaware of the agent’s un-
reliability. We will consider a case when the PR is aware of the agent’s unre-
liability. Therefore, the former can force the latter to fulfil their obligations 
with a probability of a2 allocating the full amount of funding or allocate full 
amount of funding without forcing the latter to fulfil their obligation with a 
probability of a3. At the same time, PR can act as a rent-seeking actor. There-
fore, they can conclude a contract with the agent and force them to fulfil its 
obligations with a probability of a4 or appropriate part of investment being 
unaware of the agent’s further actions. Here, two relationship systems are 
possible: 
PF and Agent — direct interaction, PR and Agent, PF and PR. In the case 
of direct interaction, the principal monitors the project implementation by 
                                                     
7 It is supposed that a company cannot be ‘revitalised’ in a year, therefore one should 
consider T periods, where t  (1,T) with a one year gap. In this case, if a project was 
approved and investment made in the period t but the agent turned out to be unreli-
able, in the period t + 1, the investment will equal zero.  
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the agent in the period ti, if the latter fails to fulfil their obligations, the agent 
will learn about it within the period ti+j discontinuing investment in the next 
period ti+j+1. 
However, if we consider the participation of all three actors, the system 
becomes much more complicated (fig.). 
 
 
 
Fig. Possible scenarios within the model 
 
Let us assume that I = 1, where I = 1,5  и bi = 1, где I = 1,4  and, 
due probability distribution, b3 < b1 and b4 < b2. It is logical to suppose that 
the most interesting cases are those where the regional principal transfers the 
full amount of funding to the agent, forcing the latter to fulfil their obliga-
tions and when the principal appropriates part of investment, nevertheless, 
forcing the agent to fulfil their obligations. The first issue we are interested 
in is the correlation of the efforts made by the mediating principal in these 
cases. Is it possible that the mediator’s actions will encourage the agent to 
act according to the first scenario? The second issue is the agent’s stimuli for 
fulfilling their obligations. The sanctions s are also taken into account. How-
ever, they will hardly have a big enough effect to prevent the actors from rent-
seeking behaviour. Evidently, the more favourable situation is that with the 
mediator controlling the agent’s actions and the agent’s profit exceeding the 
profit from concluding a contract with the mediator. For the agent, the condi-
tion for selecting a strategy (fulfilling obligations) is equivalent to a set of so-
lutions of the inequation a4b3f(1 – ) +  < a2b1f + , i. e. if the amount of in-
vestment ‘appropriated’ by the mediator does not exceed 2 1
4 3
1 a b f
a b
      . 
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Then, assuming that the principal’s utility is a certain function  of efforts 
made to monitor the actions of the agent and some of the significant vari-
ables, the area of mutually beneficial cooperation between the principal and 
agent will be within the set of solutions of the system 
2 1
4 3
1
max
a b
f
a b


        
. 
In this case, if the functions are given in a particular form and it is possi-
ble to identify the threshold values of efforts made by the principle and the 
agent’s ‘remuneration’, it is important to understand how these efforts can be 
evaluated in practice. What can become an actual stimulus for them? This 
situation necessitates examining informal institutions and cases of overcom-
ing the monotown problem within the considered structure of stakeholders. 
This, however, requires further study. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Increased activity of both authorities and various initiative groups in the 
context of the ‘monotown problem’ requires developing unique methodolo-
gies for an empirical analysis of the actual situation in monotowns. One can-
not deny the existence of the monotown problem. Of course, it is there, but it 
is important to understand to what extent it is exaggerated. A clear picture of 
the problem simplifies the search for relevant solutions. 
In this article, we have carried out a quantitative analysis of monotowns 
based on the existing list of monotowns and their socioeconomic characteris-
tics. The analysis helped obtain the following results. 
• Firstly, there is a need for a qualitative approach to selecting parame-
ters taking into account all structural factors reflecting the socioeconomic 
situation in monotowns. An accurate assessment of the necessary set of pa-
rameters simplifies the evaluation of prospects of finding a solution to the 
monotown problem due to the formation of monotown clusters with similar 
characteristics; an appropriate approach can be chosen for each cluster; 
• Secondly, both availability and accuracy of socioeconomic data can be 
an issue. When trying to analyse changes in the situation in all monotowns 
from 2007 to 2014, we had to deal with the absence of data for these years 
for a large number of monotowns. This is unfortunate, since a panel sample 
could have become a reference point for developing concepts aimed at solv-
ing the monotown problem; 
• Thirdly, it is important to consider the ADT status. At this stage, it is 
impossible to draw any conclusions about the transparency of the principles 
behind the selection of monotowns entitled to the ADT status. However, one 
can assume that the possibility of analysing the development of the ‘privi-
leged’ monotowns in comparison to the rest of them will contribute to identi-
fying key characteristics for acquiring such status and understanding its ac-
tual, not perceived, benefits. 
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